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The Hague Working Group on Space
Resources: Creating the Legal Building
Blocks for a New Industry
By Chelsey Davis and Mark J. Sundahl

R

etrieving minerals from
celestial bodies is not a new
pursuit: the Apollo missions
in the 1960s and 1970s collected
nearly 50 pounds of lunar mate
rial to return to Earth for study.
However, the space industry has
come a long way since the Apollo
era. Private companies are now developing technolo
gies to locate, extract, and process natural resources on
the Moon, asteroids, and other celestial bodies. Certain
classes of asteroids contain large quantities of valuable
natural resources, and so the mining of asteroids and
other celestial bodies could soon turn into a space-age
Gold Rush. And whereas the Apollo missions collected
Moon rocks for scientiic study, private industry plans to
harvest space resources to sustain their activities (and
the activities of others) in space, create new industries
on and off the Earth, and, ultimately, expand mankind’s
ever-growing reach into the solar system and beyond.
Companies are eager to invest the money and effort
to make this new era of space commerce thrive, but a
lack of regulatory clarity on both domestic and interna
tional levels threatens to slow its progress. In order to
provide greater clarity to investors, Congress enacted the
Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act (SREUA)
in November 2015 (as title IV of the larger U.S. Com
mercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act).1 In short,
this statute gave companies ownership rights over any
resources they extract from asteroids or other celestial
bodies. On July 13, 2017, Luxembourg became the irst
European country to enact a law regulating asteroid min
ing.2 The so-called Draft Law on the Exploration and
Use of Space Resources states that “[s]pace resources are
capable of being appropriated.”3 The law also establishes
a clear process for the government authorization of min
ing missions (something the United States has yet to do).
Given the inherently international (or more accu
rately, extranational) nature of asteroid mining, an
international discussion has also arisen at the United
Nations and other fora. In order to prepare the way for
the future regulation of space resource extraction, The
Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group
(Working Group) was created to develop so-called
“building blocks” for use in the construction of a future
legal framework governing mining activities.4 This “legal
framework” may take the form of a treaty, but it is more

likely to be a soft form of international law, such as a
U.N. resolution, or a model domestic law designed for
adoption state by state. The Working Group is agnostic
on this point and is designing the building blocks to pro
vide guidance in any sort of rulemaking.
A Brief History of Asteroid Mining Technology
On February 14, 2000, the United States launched the
irst spacecraft to successfully orbit and land on an
asteroid, the Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous–Shoe
maker (NEAR Shoemaker) spacecraft. One year after
launch, the NEAR Shoemaker spacecraft landed on
Eros, an asteroid that was 196 million miles from
Earth at the time. In 2010, Japan’s Hayabusa spacecraft
became the irst spacecraft to land on an asteroid, col
lect mineral samples, and return the samples to Earth.
In 2014, the European Rosetta spacecraft dropped
the Philae lander on comet Churyumov-Gerasimenko,
making the European Space Agency the irst to land a
spacecraft on a comet. After touching down, the Philae
lander successfully gathered data about the composi
tion of the entire asteroid in a matter of hours.
With government programs having paved the way,
private companies are now spearheading the develop
ment of space mining technology. The growing list of
such companies includes Planetary Resources, Deep
Space Industries, Shackleton Energy, iSpace, and Kepler
Energy & Space Engineering LLC, all of which, except
iSpace (a Japanese company), are headquartered in the
United States. Deep Space Industries will soon launch its
irst prospecting missions, using advanced, small satel
lites to explore and study the composition of near-earth
asteroids. Planetary Resources is likewise launching
Ceres, a constellation of its Arkyd-100 satellites that will
carry out advanced imaging of Earth while serving as a
testbed for the company’s technology that will be used
for locating resources on asteroids. With a slightly differ
ent focus, iSpace is focusing its efforts on locating and
extracting lunar resources and will soon be launching
initial missions to probe ice deposits on the Moon.
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The Business Case
Although asteroids carry enormous deposits of plat
inum and other valuable metals, common ice will
likely be, at least in the short term, the most valu
able resource in space. Ice not only will provide
water to astronauts, but also can be broken down to
create hydrogen for fuel and oxygen to breathe. Min
ing water from asteroids has the potential to create a
trillion-dollar market in space. Companies and gov
ernments currently spend billions of dollars each year
sending satellites into orbit whose life is limited by
the amount of onboard fuel that is needed to main
tain a proper orbit. If water can be converted to fuel
that could be made available for on-orbit refueling of
satellites, it would dramati
cally extend satellite life (as
well as fuel spacecraft for
missions beyond Earth orbit).
It is critical that Planetary Resources posits
that such refueling stations
the Working Group’s will “triple the up-mass of
orbit bound
building blocks GEO-stationary
rockets, extend the life of
clarify that private telecommunications satellites,
and remove hazardous space
ownership rights debris all for a small fraction
current costs.”5
may be exercised of The
eventual mining of rare
over extracted earth metals, such as plati
num group metals (PGMs),
space resources. also has the ability to lower
the costs of such materials and
spur innovation in technology.
These PGMs are byproducts of
iron, nickel, and cobalt extrac
tion and consist of platinum, osmium, iridium, rhodium,
ruthenium, and palladium, which are all found in aster
oids. One estimate places the present market value of
these PGMs in the thousands of trillions of dollars.6 In
short, asteroids hold a possibility of tremendous wealth
for those companies that can develop the technology to
harvest these resources.
The Legal Issues
There are many challenges that lie ahead for these
emerging space mining companies. Most are technologi
cal, but others require legal solutions. Some of the legal
issues that are at the forefront include: (1) the right to
own any extracted resources, (2) priority rights to min
ing claims, (3) noninterference in mining operations, and
(4) regulatory clarity without excessive regulation.
Ownership Rights
Investors in these new companies may be wary to
invest the billions of dollars needed if there is uncer
tainty about the legality of laying claim to the resources
that are extracted. The highest legal hurdle to clear in

the terms of ownership rights over space resources
is found in article II of the Outer Space Treaty, which
states that “[o]uter space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appro
priation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means.”7 Fortunately, most
experts interpret this article as prohibiting national
appropriation of entire celestial bodies but allowing for
the ownership of extracted resources. In other words,
the law regarding the extraction of space resources is
largely seen as analogous to the law of the high seas,
which allows international waters to be ished and its
seabeds to be mined.8
Despite the weight of expert opinion falling on
the side of ownership rights, there are still some who
question the legality of private ownership rights over
space resources. To provide clarity on this point, the
SREUA was enacted to give comfort to investors that
ownership rights may be asserted over any “abiotic
resource in situ . . . found on or within a single aster
oid” that has been “recovered” by a U.S. citizen.9 To
allay any concerns that the United States is prepar
ing to lay claim to celestial bodies, the SREUA goes
on to state that “the United States does not . . . assert
sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or juris
diction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body.”10
The Luxembourg law also grants ownership rights to
asteroid miners (though somewhat more obliquely
than the U.S. law) by stating that “[s]pace resources
are capable of being appropriated in accordance with
international law.”11
Although domestic legislatures are working to elimi
nate uncertainty on this issue, the interpretation of an
international treaty begs for an international solution.
It is therefore critical that the Working Group’s build
ing blocks clarify that private ownership rights may be
exercised over extracted space resources. However, not
all questions would be settled by a grant of such rights.
For example, would a right to extract natural resources
allow a company to mine a small asteroid until it is com
pletely consumed? Or would this amount to an act of
national appropriation? The answer may lie in the dei
nition of “celestial body” (a term that is undeined in the
treaty). Another question raised by a minority of com
mentators is whether the Outer Space Treaty prohibition
on national appropriation has any application to private
mining activity at all.
Priority Rights to Mining Claims
An equally important issue for mining companies is the
need for assurance that they will have exclusive rights
(which could be something less than property rights)
over a certain surface area of a celestial body before they
expend large amounts of capital sending machinery to the
area to begin mining. Because of this, it is vital that the
Working Group’s building blocks provide for such prior
ity rights. This might most easily be accomplished with a
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public registry and a “irst to register” priority rule. How
ever, multiple side issues would remain. How large could
the claim be? How long should the exclusive mining
rights last? Perhaps the priority rights should be awarded
only after an organization has some physical presence
on the mining site, but not merely on the basis of hav
ing discovered resources by remote sensing. This would
also protect against claims being granted to companies
that have no actual intention or capability to mine—which
would result in unworked mining claims that would pre
vent the eficient use of existing space resources. A similar
problem was faced by the International Telecommunica
tions Union (ITU) in the early 2000s with “paper satellites”
that were granted rights to geostationary orbital slots
without the applicant countries having any actual inten
tion to place a satellite in orbit. Understandably, countries
feared that they would lose the right to use the scarce
resource of these orbital slots. However, the proliferation
of “paper satellites” prevented the eficient use of orbital
resources by those countries (and companies) that were
actually capable of using the orbital slots.12 A signiicant
registration fee or a requirement to work the mine within
a certain amount of time could also be implemented to
deter paper ilings.
Noninterference
Companies also need assurance that their operations will
be protected from interference from competing compa
nies. A “zone of noninterference” that is even larger than
the mining claim could be established, because even
distant activities by another operator in a low-gravity
environment can lead to interference (if, for example,
a detonation throws rubble into the atmosphere). In
its simplest form, a zone of noninterference could be
implemented through the same registry used to deter
mine priority. Once a company registers the coordinates
and nature of its activity, all other entities would be put
on notice of potential interference should they oper
ate in the vicinity of the registered coordinates. Such
prior notice would trigger a duty under article IX of the
Outer Space Treaty for consultations prior to the com
mencement of any activities that could result in “harmful
interference” with the registered activity. So-called “buffer
zones,” typically in the range of 500 meters, are routinely
provided for energy companies drilling for oil and gas
from off-shore platforms here on Earth.
The building blocks should provide for some
mechanism to prevent interference among operators.
Whether this is best accomplished by merely giving
public notice of activity or by an explicit creation of a
buffer zone around the area of activity will likely be a
matter of debate.
Regulatory Clarity without Excessive Regulation
As the space mining industry evolves, the law will
evolve with it. Regulatory clarity is necessary in order
for investors to evaluate regulatory risk. The discreet

issues of ownership, priority, and noninterference
aside, article VI of the Outer Space Treaty requires
that states “authorize and continually supervise” the
activities of their nationals. Compliance with article VI
requires that states establish a process for companies
to receive authorization for their space missions. The
Luxembourg law provides for such a process. Perhaps
surprisingly, the United States is behind the curve on
this issue because currently no government agency
is clearly authorized by Congress to license nontradi
tional space activities, such as asteroid mining. There
is also a question of how detailed and extensive
domestic law must be in order to comply with article
VI. It would be helpful if the Working Group could
provide some guidance on this
issue.
A related area of concern
for space mining companies is
Incremental
the fear that governments will
regulation as the
create overly burdensome regulations that are premature and
industry gains
created without the beneit of
learning from practice. For this
experience and
reason, the United States has a
develops best
moratorium on design requirements for suborbital lights until
practices will
2025. Incremental regulation
as the industry gains experi
help ensure that
ence and develops best practices
companies remain
will help ensure that companies
remain free to innovate, particu
free to innovate.
larly during the early stages of
the industry when technological
challenges are at their greatest.
A similarly cautious approach
to regulation should be taken for the space mining
industry.
As new technology is developed, it is necessary that
law grows with it; however, in most areas it is almost
impossible to estimate all the possible issues that will
require regulation or all the possible outcomes of a
certain activity. In this way, law is mainly a reactive
process. In the meantime, industry should ill in the
gaps through best practices. Thus, the burden of selfregulation will fall on industry. In this way, industry
will receive the certainty it needs while getting the
amount of lexibility it requires to grow.
The Hague Space Resources Governance
Working Group
While individual countries, such as the United States and
Luxembourg, are taking steps under domestic law to
provide the legal clarity needed by the mining compa
nies, clarity is also needed on the international level. The
Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group is
the leading international effort to address the legal issues
related to space mining. The Working Group was created
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by The Hague Institute for Global Justice in 2014.13 The
Working Group’s goal is the “identiication and formu
lation of building blocks for the governance of space
resource activities as a basis for negotiations on an inter
national agreement or non-legally binding instrument.”14
The Working Group is supported by a consortium
and is administered by a secretariat headquartered
at the International Institute of Air and Space Law at
Leiden University (which also maintains the Work
ing Group’s website). The Working Group consists of
approximately 25 members and a larger number of
observers who participate in the discussions but not in
making decisions. The membership is geographically
diverse and is made up of representatives of indus
try, government, academia, and
nongovernmental organiza
tions. The Working Group is
inanced by contributions from
The Working the Dutch Ministries of Foreign
and Economic Affairs, Secure
Group’s goal is the World Foundation, and Deep
Industries. Three face-to
identification and Space
face meetings have been held
formulation of so far, and a fourth face-to-face
meeting is scheduled for Sep
building blocks for tember 11–13, 2017. By the
of 2017 (and perhaps as
the governance end
early as fall), the group plans
of space resource to release a draft set of build
ing blocks for public comment.
activities. The Working Group plans to
resume work in 2018 to con
sider any comments received.
Although no drafts of the
building blocks have been
released to date, the Working Group posted the fol
lowing list of building block titles following its April
2016 meeting. The list gives insight into the broad
scope of the project as well as indicates which topics
are of particular interest to the Working Group.
1. Objective of international legal framework
2. Deinition of key terms
3. Scope of international legal framework
4. Principles of international legal framework
5. Exercise of jurisdiction over space resource
activities
6. Access to space resources
7. Utilization of space resources
8. Safety of space resource activities
9. Prevention and abatement of harmful impacts
of outer space activities
10. Sharing of beneits arising out of the utilization
of space resources
11. Exchange of information under inter
national legal framework
12. Provision of assistance in case of distress
13. Liability in case of damage

14. Monitoring and inspection of space resource
activities
15. Compliance with and enforcement of interna
tional legal framework
16. Institutional arrangements of international legal
framework
17. Settlement of disputes
18. Final clauses of international legal framework
This list relects the expansive expertise of the
Working Group and its understanding of the breadth
of the legal issues at hand. The topics discussed above
(ownership, priority, noninterference, and clear incre
mental regulation) would appear to fall under building
blocks 6, 7, 8, 9, and 14. But the list of building blocks
also shows legal concerns from other stakeholders.
For example, building block 10 raises the issue of
the sharing of beneits that low from space resource
extraction. This refers to article I of the Outer Space
Treaty, which famously states: “The exploration and
use of outer space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the bene
it and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of
their degree of economic or scientiic development,
and shall be the province of all mankind.”
The interpretation of “for the beneit and in the
interests of all countries” is one of the long-debated,
but largely settled, international legal issues before the
Working Group. When we look at other sectors of the
space industry, such as telecommunications, the ben
eits shared with other countries are not in the form
of proits, but instead come in the far more valuable
creation of the technology for a communications infra
structure that is used throughout the world. The space
mining industry undoubtedly promises great wealth to
its investors, but the greater beneit will be found in the
economic opportunities that will low from this new
industry on many levels both in space and on Earth.
As the Working Group continues its work and dis
cussions take place at the United Nations and in
other fora, the international community will hopefully
arrive soon at a consensus on the application of inter
national law to space mining. In the meantime, the
debates about domestic legislation will continue in
Washington, Luxembourg, and other countries that are
interested in attracting the space mining industry. As
is frequently the case in the ield of space law, aster
oid mining provides a perfect example of how law
and technology often evolve hand-in-hand.
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